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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide the background to an evaluation of the 
utility of the Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) as a valid predictor of future 
mishaps. The end goal is to be able to use the survey to identify “at risk” U.S. Naval squadrons 
prior to the occurrence of mishaps. The CSAS was designed to measure the safety climate of 
U.S. Naval aviation squadrons. In this literature review, safety climate will be defined and the 
method of measurement outlined. The literature concerning the correlation of safety climate with 
other indicators of safety performance will be discussed. Finally, the research on safety climate 
that has been carried out in aviation will be delineated, with a specific emphasis on the method 
used to assess the safety climate in U.S. military aviation. 
The military operates in a high-risk environment, utilizing highly complex technologies 
to achieve mission goals. The reliability of the hardware and software of these complex systems 
has been steadily improving, resulting in dramatic decreases in the number of failures over the 
last century (O’Connor & Cohen, 2010). To illustrate, in U.S Naval aviation, 776 aircraft were 
destroyed due to accidents in 1954, compared to only 24 in 2000 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
However, although the absolute mishap rate has decreased, the proportion of mishaps attributed 
to human error has not decreased at the same rate as the mishaps involving mechanical and 
environmental factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). In U.S. Naval aviation, human error 
accounts for more than 80% of mishaps (Naval Safety Center, 2006). This finding is not unique 
to U.S. Naval aviation, as between 80% and 90% of all work-related accidents and incidents can 
be attributed to human error (Health and Safety Executive, 2002; Hollnagel, 1993; Reason, 
1990). Therefore, as has been the case with other High Reliability Organizations (HROs; those 
organizations which are operating technology that is sufficiently complex to be subject to 
catastrophic accidents; Shrivastava, 1986), the United States military has recognized the need to 
focus upon the human causes of mishaps. 
Traditionally, safety performance has been assessed solely on the basis of “lagging 
indicators” of safety such as fatalities, or mishap rates. However, as safety has improved and the 
frequency of mishaps has declined, mishap rates have ceased to be a useful metric of safety 
performance. Therefore, HROs have started to examine “leading indicators” of safety. The 
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United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2006) defined leading indicators of safety 
as measures of process or inputs essential to deliver the desired safety outcomes (e.g., safety 
climate surveys, hazard reports). Lagging indicators show when a desired safety outcome has 
failed or has not been achieved (e.g., number of mishaps). Therefore, leading indicators of safety 
are used in an attempt to gain insight into the safety performance of the organization and identify 
areas in which efforts should be made to improve safety. 
A. DEFINITIONS OF SAFETY CULTURE AND SAFETY CLIMATE 
Zohar (1980) defined safety climate as a summary of perceptions that employees share 
about their work environment. Safety climate describes employees’ perceptions, attitudes, and 
beliefs about risk and safety (Mearns & Flin, 1999). It is a “snapshot” of the current state of 
safety in the organization. There has been an ongoing debate within the literature regarding the 
use of the terms “culture” and “climate,” and whether they represent the same or different 
concepts. The general consensus is that culture represents the more stable and enduring 
characteristics of the organization, and has been likened to its traits or “personality.” Safety 
culture is a more complex and enduring trait, reflecting fundamental values, norms, assumptions, 
and expectations, which, to some extent, reside in societal culture (Mearns & Flin, 1999). 
Climate, on the other hand, is thought to represent a more visible manifestation of the culture, 
which can be seen as its “mood state,” at a particular moment in time (Cox & Flin, 1998). 
Denison (1996) argues that the methods used by researchers can help to distinguish 
between culture and climate studies. He argues that culture requires qualitative measures, while 
climate requires quantitative measures. Because the questionnaire survey is the predominant 
method used for investigating safety, it is now widely recognized that this method reflects the 
climate of the organization at the time of the study (Denison, 1996). However, it is generally 
agreed that climate can be used as an indication of the underlying safety culture (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999). The point is put succinctly by Rousseau (1985), who states that the 
similarities between the concepts of climate and culture are sufficiently overlapping for research 
on one to inform us about the other. For the remainder of this literature review, we focus on 
safety climate. 
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B. MEASURING SAFETY CLIMATE 
As discussed above, safety climate is almost predominately measured using a 
questionnaire methodology. Guldenmund (2007) describes this method as a quick, but also 
“dirty” technique for measuring safety climate. It is dirty because it arguably only gives a little 
insight into the safety climate of the organization from a single perspective. Guldenmund (2007) 
states that “the challenge is to develop a questionnaire that yields just enough relevant 
information—the trusted ‘wet finger’ to find out which way the wind blows—to decide whether 
and possibly where any corrective measures or actions are opportune” (p. 724). 
Unlike the field of personality assessment, in which consensus has been largely reached 
regarding personality constructs, there has been no such agreement regarding safety climate 
constructs. It is debatable whether safety climate instruments should be generic or specific in 
nature (Cox & Flin, 1998). Cheyne, Tomas, Cox, and Oliver (1999) argued that the architecture 
of employee attitudes to safety was context-dependent and varied by industrial sector. Likewise, 
Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams (1995) found different factor structures, using the same safety 
climate scale, in two Australian health care organisations, concluding that the likelihood of 
establishing a universal and stable set of safety climate factors was highly doubtful. Zohar (2003) 
concurs, arguing that safety climate indicators should be subdivided into universal and industry-
specific indicators. 
Over 40 different safety climate measures have been developed (Yule, O’Connor, & Flin, 
2003). These questionnaires tend to be self-administered, and can be delivered to a large number 
of people in an organization relatively easily. The first stage in developing a safety climate 
questionnaire is to identify a number of thematic items that are thought to be relevant to the 
safety climate. Guldenmund (2007) differentiates between two methods for identifying the items: 
a normative, or theoretical, approach in which the items are derived on the basis of a theoretical 
model of safety climate, or a pragmatic approach in which the questionnaire builds upon 
previous research. Responses to each item are generally assessed using a Likert scale. For 
analytic purposes, these scales are generally considered to be interval (although they almost 
certainly are not), so that multivariate statistical methods can be used. 
The items are designed to assess a particular safety climate theme (e.g., safety systems). 
The purpose is to develop a number of scales that can be used to evaluate whether there are 
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differences between groups of respondents on particular aspects of the safety climate. Using 
scales, as opposed to examining the responses to single items, allows the researcher to have a 
greater reliability in the participant’s view of a particular aspect of the safety climate. 
Once the data has been collected, exploratory factor analysis is used to identify whether 
the items are grouping (or loading) on the themes as anticipated. As part of this process, items 
are often discarded. Themes also may be deleted, combined, or renamed. This adaption to the 
questionnaire is a normal part of the factor analysis process. Once a stable factor structure has 
been established, attempts may then be made to confirm this structure with a different data set. 
The exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analyses are a necessary process in the construction 
of reliable scales. These techniques also help to establish the construct validity of the tool. 
Construct validity is concerned with the extent to which the questionnaire measures what it is 
intended to measure. Identification of a reliable factor structure, that is consistent with theory, 
helps the researcher substantiate claims regarding the validity of the questionnaire, although 
there is no consensus on the specific factors that comprise the safety climate. As seen in a 
number of reviews (e.g., Cohen, 1977; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000; Hale & Hovden, 1998; Shannon, Mayr, & Haynes, 1997), there is some agreement 
regarding the themes that are relevant to the construct of safety climate. These common themes 
will be discussed in the next section. 
C. COMMON SAFETY CLIMATE THEMES 
Although there are a large number of factors that have been identified by safety climate 
researchers, these factors can be reduced to a limited number of themes (Gadd & Collins, 2002; 
Flin et al., 2000). To illustrate, in a review of 18 safety climate questionnaires, Flin et al., (2000) 
identified six common themes: management/supervision, safety systems, risk, work pressure, 
competence/training, and procedures/rules. Each of these themes will be discussed below. 
1. Management/Supervision 
A factor concerned with management is identified about 75% of the time in safety 
climate research (Gadd & Collins, 2002; Flin et al., 2000). However, this term is rather nebulous 
and refers to a wide range of managerial behaviors, from the development of the safety program 
to the quality of labor-management relations. Nonetheless, the research suggests that managers 
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can demonstrate their commitment to safety in a number of tangible ways—first, through their 
commitment to structural and procedural safety systems including the development of the safety 
program. This program includes a diverse range of activities such as: good housekeeping and 
environmental conditions, good training facilities, clear safety policy and goals, formal 
inspections at regular and frequent intervals, thorough investigations of all accidents and near 
misses, thorough record keeping, rules and regulations regularly updated and evidence of 
management and staff compliance with them, a high priority being given to safety at company 
meetings, an active safety committee and a high-ranking safety officer (Cohen, Smith, & Cohen, 
1975; Smith, Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1978; Simons & Shafai-Sharai, 1977). Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, management can demonstrate their commitment to safety through 
their attitudes, behaviors, and styles of leadership. These factors tend to be less tangible than the 
structural and procedural variables, but nonetheless are thought to have at least as powerful an 
effect on workforce safety motivation (Eyssen-McKeown, Eakin, Hoffmann, & Spengler, 1980; 
Andriessen, 1978; Zohar, 1980, 2000). In fact, Hale and Hovden (1998) suggest that structural 
factors are likely to be critical only in organizations with a poor safety climate; they cease to 
discriminate once the company has achieved a modest level of advancement in safety 
management. It is the other less tangible factors concerning management’s attitudes and style of 
leadership, as well as the nature and quality of interactions with the workforce, which are better 
at discriminating the excellent from the good organizations. 
The importance of interactions between managers and workers has been clearly 
established through the research (Andriessen, 1978; Hale & Hovden, 1998). Specifically, 
management participation and involvement in work and safety activities, as well as frequent, 
informal communications between workers and management, are recognized as critical 
behaviors. These interactions serve a number of useful functions: they demonstrate the 
managers’ concern for safety; serve as a frame of reference for the workforce to guide 
appropriate task behaviors; foster closer ties between managers, supervisors, and workers; 
encourage a free exchange of ideas on job improvement; and provide an opportunity for the early 
recognition of hazards and improper job practices (Cohen, 1977). More importantly,  
worker-management interaction provides a clear indication of an overt, active, and genuine 
concern for safety on the part of management. The evidence strongly supports the utility of 
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management demonstrating the priority for safety over production goals (Eyessen-McKeown  
et al., 1980; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997). Interestingly, those organizations that have clear safety 
goals also tend to be more productive (Peters, 1989). 
A decentralized approach to safety management has been shown to be the most effective 
way in which management can promote workforce safety motivation (Griffin, Burley, & Neal, 
2000; Simard & Marchand, 1995). This approach is achieved by encouraging the joint 
involvement of supervisors with employees in relatively structured safety activities. Indeed, 
decentralized management at all levels is not only the best predictor of workgroups’ propensity 
to safety initiatives; it also is the most important factor in relation to two other predictors of 
worker motivation to safety, namely workgroup cooperation and cohesion (Simard & Marchand, 
1995). Cooperative relationships are characterized by a positive team spirit and willingness to 
cooperate with other team members, and other teams, in order to achieve the organization’s 
goals. Workgroups, which are internally cohesive and cooperative, also tend to be more 
cooperative with management (Griffin et al., 2000). Thus, any attempt by senior management to 
increase workers’ safety motivation must begin by attempting to increase supervisors’ and 
workers’ capacity to behave cooperatively with each other, thereby meeting their social and 
autonomous needs. 
A number of supervisory-level variables also have been identified as being associated 
with good safety performance. Specifically, participative and supportive supervisory behavior is 
identified as critical to safe performance (Niskanen, 1994; Flin, Mearns, Gordon, & Fleming, 
1996). These supervisory behaviors are strongly promoted when the supervisors are allowed 
autonomy within their own jobs. Numerous studies suggest that a decentralized approach on the 
part of more senior management is conducive to more participative relationships further down 
the line (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). 
The empirical evidence suggests that it is not just management commitment, 
participation, and involvement in safety activities that are important, but the extent to which 
management encourages the involvement of the workforce. In particular, the workforce must be 
permitted to help shape interventions rather than simply be passive recipients. In this way, 
workers are more likely to take ownership and responsibility for safety and to become actively 
motivated to take personal initiative in safety (Niskanen, 1994; Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & 
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Biancotti, 1997). Cohen and Cleveland (1983) make the following observations based upon their 
three-phased study: people work more safely when they are involved in decision-making 
processes; when they have specific and reasonable responsibilities; authority and goals; and 
when they have immediate feedback about their job performance. 
2. Safety Systems 
This very broad theme has a number of overlapping dimensions to it, including: the 
condition of physical plant and equipment; safety systems such as Permit to Work (PTW) 
systems, hazard identification systems, and including incident reporting systems; accident 
investigation and record keeping; safety rules, policies, and procedures; selection promotion and 
training; safety department effectiveness; and communication and feedback mechanisms  
(Flin et al., 2000). A factor related to safety systems is identified in about two-thirds of safety 
climate studies (Gadd & Collins, 2002; Flin et al., 2000). 
Perception of the safety systems is clearly an important component of safety climate. For 
example, in a safety climate study of offshore oil company workers, Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and 
Fleming (1998) found that reporting systems, rules and procedures, and safety systems were 
among the key factors related to self-reported accident involvement. Similarly, in an 
investigation of safety practices among a telephone company’s construction and maintenance 
workers, Eyssen-McKeown et al. (1980) found that lower injury rates were associated with the 
perceived effectiveness of safety regulations and the safety program. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that perceptions of leadership commitment to safety 
appear to influence opinions about the safety system, which in turn appear to influence 
employees’ at-risk behaviors and injury rates (Simard & Marchand, 1994, 1995, 1997). A 
comparison of high and low accident companies has shown that in high-performing companies, 
safety policy and procedures were characterized by clarity, consistency, and emphasis (Gaertner, 
Newman, Perry, Fisher, & Whitehead, 1987). 
Unfortunately, because data related to safety systems are often available from other more 
traditional methods such as safety audits and hazard reports, issues related to the safety system 
are often omitted from climate scales. Bailey and Petersen (1989) concluded that the 
effectiveness of safety programs cannot be measured by the more traditional procedural-
engineering criteria popularly thought to be factors in successful programs. They argue that a 
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better measure of safety program effectiveness is the response from the entire organization to 
questions about the quality of the management systems that have an effect on human behavior 
relating to safety. 
3. Training and Competency 
The workforce’s perception of the general level of workers’ qualifications, skills, and 
knowledge is the essence of this theme. Training is a key component, both directly through its 
effect on workers’ competency to perform their work functions, but also indirectly through 
influencing perceptions about management’s commitment to safe and reliable work systems. In 
fact, Cooper and Phillips (2004) demonstrated that workers’ perceptions of the significance of 
safety training were the most important safety climate factor predicting actual safety behavior. 
In recent years, many high-reliability organizations have embarked upon a process of 
multiskilling the workforce. This process can be seen positively or negatively by the workforce, 
depending upon whether it is properly applied and resourced. Concurrent with this development, 
HROs have also emphasized competence in nontechnical skills (e.g., leadership and decision 
making) that are regarded as contributing factors to safe operations (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). 
These are usually taught in crew resource management training programs (Flin, O’Connor, & 
Crichton, 2008) and, as such training becomes more widespread, this aspect of the skill base also 
may need to be incorporated into a competence factor. 
4. Risk 
The risk literature focuses on three aspects of risk: 
 risk perception – the extent to which a person believes a particular activity or 
situation is risky;  
 risk tolerance – the extent to which a person is willing to engage in risky 
behaviors; and  
 risk behavior – the frequency with which a person engages in risky activities or 
situations (Kivmaki, Kalimo, & Salminen, 1995; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991). 
In the aviation industry, pilots who reported higher risk perception also reported lower 
risk tolerance towards experiencing risky aviation activities, particularly for weather-related 
situations (Hunter, 2002). Importantly, the number of experienced hazardous events was 
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consistent with self-reported risk tolerance (e.g., those pilots who rated various aviation activities 
as more risky than the average pilot experienced fewer hazardous events [Hunter, 2002]). 
Additionally, risk tolerance was a significant factor in a model attempting to distinguish between 
pilots who had experienced an accident and those who had not (Platenius & Wilde, 1989). Pilots 
involved in an accident were more likely to endorse statements such as “I fly in spite of advice 
from others,” “if a pilot doesn’t take occasional risks, they won’t learn to get out of 
emergencies,” and “physically capable people can take more risks.” 
Studies of risk perception in other industries have shown that workers have fairly 
accurate perceptions of the risks they face (Flin et al., 1996). Moreover, just as in the aviation 
environment, higher threat perception is positively related to safe behaviors. For example, 
Goldberg, Dar-El, and Rubin (1991) found that a high threat perception was related to readiness 
to participate in safety programs, the relationship was mediated by coworker support for safety. 
Workers who sensed high coworker support for safety were more likely to be positively oriented 
towards greater participation. Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, and Tomas (1998) found that perception of 
workplace hazards did not have a direct effect on levels of safety activity by the workforce. 
However, an indirect effect was found, such that higher appraisals of workplace hazards were 
related to more positive perceptions of individual responsibility, which, in turn, affects levels of 
safety activity. Similarly, Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) speculate that workers’ perceptions of 
risk and control may be highly related to workers’ involvement and responsibility for safety. 
Overall then, it seems that risk perceptions and safety behaviors are positively related to 
perceptions of involvement. 
In a study of U.S. coal mines, the opposite effect also appears to hold true. Brown, Willis 
and Prussia (2000) found that safety hazards directly caused accidents and indirectly influenced 
employees’ perceptions of the safety climate. Higher perceptions of hazard are associated with 
reduced perceptions of manager and supervisor attitudes towards safety. Higher perceptions of 
risk are also associated with increased production pressure, which leads to unsafe behaviors. 
5. Work Pressure 
Factors relating to work pace, workload and work pressure, and production pressure are 
common in safety climate surveys, and for good reason. This factor has consistently shown a 
positive relationship with accident rates. For example, Cooper and Phillips (2004) found 
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significant differences in perceptions of work pace between accident-involved and non-accident-
involved workers. Diaz and Cabrera (1997) found that employees’ perceptions of the 
organization’s philosophy of either production or safety, was the second most important factor 
(after organizational policies towards safety) in predicting safety performance. Pfeifer, Stefanski, 
and Grerther (1976) questionnaire results indicate that supervisors in low-accident rate mines 
were significantly less inclined to push hard for production or to cut corners on safety. Sanders, 
Patterson, and Peay (1976) found that increased levels of production pressure were associated 
with increased lost time injury rates. 
In his sociological investigations into the causes of accidents in the U.K.’s offshore oil 
industry, Wright (1986) found that perceptions of performance pressure can lead workers to 
believe that engaging in short-cut behavior is an expected or required part of the job. Workers 
who perceive a high degree of performance pressure will focus their attention on completing the 
work and focus less on the safety of their work procedures. 
6. Procedures/Rules 
Guldenmund (2000) identified procedural and rule compliance as one of the most 
frequently occurring themes in his review of safety climate research. Perceptions of safety rules, 
attitudes to rules and compliance, and violation of procedures are addressed. This theme is also 
related to risk-taking behaviors, as these can involve rule breaking. Some of these factors have 
been shown to relate to accident involvement in safety climate surveys (e.g., Lee, 1998), but 
causal relationships remain more obscure and are likely to be influenced by supervisory behavior 
and work pressure variables. This issue has received scrutiny in studies of worksite safety 
(Reason, 1998), suggesting that procedural compliance is an issue that should be addressed in 
measures of safety climate. 
Like many of the other safety climate themes, procedural and rule compliance appears to 
be strongly influenced by perceptions of management and labor-management relations. For 
example, Thompson, Hilton, and Witt (1998) found that the supervisor’s role in promoting 
workplace safety is achieved by affecting the perceived level of fairness in their organization’s 
climate, which, in turn, impacts on workforce compliance with safety rules. Likewise, Simard 
and Marchand (1997) found that a cohesive and cooperative workgroup relationship is by far the 
most important variable in terms of predicting workgroups’ propensity to comply with safety 
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rules. Cooperative relationships are characterized by more open communications and positive 
team spirit. 
Overall, the studies reviewed reveal a number of interesting findings relating to the nature 
of workforce motivation and the changing roles of managers, supervisors, and workers. It seems 
that employees are now expected to do more than just comply with rules and regulations. They 
are expected to act proactively, be personally committed to safety, take responsibility and 
ownership for safety, and be committed to corporate safety goals. 
To summarize, the six themes reviewed above represent those that are most commonly 
included in measures of safety climate. It also can be seen that the literature supports the notion 
that these themes should be considered when assessing the safety climate of an organization. 
Thus, a measure of safety climate should include items that address each of these themes. In the 
next section, the evidence linking safety climate to other measures of safety performance will  
be discussed. 
D. CORRELATING SAFETY CLIMATE WITH OTHER MEASURES OF SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE 
In addition to establishing the construct validity of a safety climate questionnaire, it is 
also necessary to determine the discriminate validity. If the tool is insufficiently sensitive in its 
ability to differentiate between organizations or personnel with different levels of safety 
performance, then the tool is of limited usefulness. The discriminate validity can be assessed by 
correlating the data from the questionnaire with a criterion variable such as accidents, or other 
safety-related behavior (Guldenmund, 2007). 
In recent years, a large number of research studies have been conducted that have sought 
to examine the contribution of safety climate to accidents. The challenge facing researchers has 
been to highlight measurable dimensions of safety climate that can be used to identify, in 
advance, the strengths and weaknesses within an organization that influence the likelihood of 
accidents occurring. A variety of different criteria are used upon which to base evaluations of 
organizational effectiveness in preventing accidents including: company accident statistics; 
comparison of high and low accident rate plants, and evaluation of plants with outstanding safety 
records; and self-reported safety behaviors and safety attitudes. 
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1. Company Accident Statistics 
Over the past two decades, researchers have demonstrated relationships between a variety 
of safety climate factors and accident rates across a range of high-risk industries. Such studies 
have shown that the degree of safety program development and workers’ safety initiative were 
related to lower work accident and injury rates (Simard & Marchand, 1994; Zohar, 2000; Dwyer 
& Raftery, 1991; Donald & Canter, 1994; Mearns, Rundmo, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2004). 
Johnson (2007) provides support for safety climate as a viable construct and as a 
predictive indicator of safety-related outcomes. This study used the responses of 292 employees 
at three locations of a heavy manufacturing organization to complete the 16-item Zohar Safety 
Climate Questionnaire (ZSCQ; Zohar & Luria, 2005). In addition, safety behavior and accident 
experience data were collected for five months following the survey and were analyzed to 
identify correlations, associations, internal consistency, and factorial structures. Results revealed 
that safety climate, as measured by the ZSCQ, served as an effective predictor of safety-related 
outcomes (behavior and accident experience). 
There are problems with using accident rates because they are a notoriously unreliable 
measure of an organization’s true safety performance. Used alone, they can be a misleading 
indicator of the effectiveness of a safety program (Thompson et al., 1998). Four main difficulties 
have been identified:  
1. restriction of variance: accidents are rare occurrences, which can make the data 
unreliable; 
2. random events that are not under the direct control of personnel can sometimes 
intercede to cause accidents, which also produces unreliability; 
3. accidents may not be consistently recorded across organizations, and over and 
under recording causes unreliability; and  
4. the measurement of accident severity is often a highly subjective issue and, 
therefore, also causes unreliability (Thompson et al., 1998; Witt, Hellman, & 
Hilton, 1994; Zohar, 1980). For these reasons, many researchers have abandoned 
the use of accident frequency data and accident severity rates as a measure of 
safety effectiveness, in favor of measures such as self-reported accident 
involvement (see later for a discussion). 
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2. Comparison of High and Low Accident Rate Plants 
Other studies have compared high- and low-accident-rate plants (or evaluated plants with 
outstanding safety records) as their criteria upon which to base judgments of effectiveness. 
However, it is difficult to identify those variables that are crucial to their outstanding 
performance, as opposed to those that are simply associated with it. The differences highlighted 
between good and bad companies may only be a fraction of the total and these differences may 
change over time (Mearns, Flin, & O’Connor, 2001). Furthermore, the causal relationship 
between variables and outcomes are not proven, it is often difficult to say which is the 
independent variable and which the dependent variable (Hale & Hovden, 1998). Nonetheless, the 
early studies that compared high- and low-accident-rate organizations did identify issues that 
have been supported by the other more objective approaches to validation. 
As with much of the other literature on safety culture and climate, in studies that compare 
high- and low-accident-rate plants, management emerges as a key and consistent determinant of 
safety performance. In particular, management’s commitment to safety was found to be greater 
in low-accident-rate plants than in the high-accident-rate plants (Cohen, Smith, & Cohen, 1975; 
Smith et al., 1978; Cohen & Cleveland, 1983). Commitment is expressed through the allocation 
of resources to safety and health, and more active involvement and participation by management 
in safety program matters (Cohen & Cleveland, 1983; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997). Aside from their 
commitment, a manager’s style of leadership (centralized or decentralized), a manager’s 
involvement with workers, and labor-management relations appear to be the key factors that 
distinguish the high from the low performers (Braithwait, 1985; DeMichiei, Langton, Bullock, & 
Wiles, 1982). 
High levels of management control over work organization and task structure, serves to 
reduce worker autonomy and worker integration, which is associated with higher accident rates 
(Dwyer & Raftery, 1991; Braithwait, 1985; Sanders et al., 1976). Worker involvement in 
decision making and policy setting serves to reverse this trend. Cohen and Cleveland (1983), in 
their analysis of the top-performing companies, found that in the best companies in the USA, 
workers were more involved in the decision-making process. They had a direct channel to 
communicate their thoughts and ideas to management; management was more receptive and 
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responsive to requests and suggestions; and more frequently solicited input concerning policies 
and procedures from workers. 
Conversely, poor labor management relations are associated with significantly higher  
self-reported violation rates and higher injury rates (Gaertner et al., 1987). Direct channels of 
communication between labor and management appear to be an important factor. Smith et al. 
(1978) found that management of low-accident-rate plants seemed to have a greater level of one-
to-one interaction with their employees, while in high-accident-rate plants, management more 
often relied upon committees to interact with employees. Similar findings are reported by Cohen 
and Cleveland (1983), who found that the top-performing companies provided direct and 
immediate channels of communication and positive employee-management interactions. 
3. Self-Reported Safety Behavior 
Self-reported safety behavior and safety attitudes are an alternative to relying on mishaps 
data to evaluate the effectiveness of an organization’s safety program. Thompson et al. (1998) 
suggested that minor workplace accidents often go unreported, yet these events may be the best 
indicators of improving (or worsening) safety conditions that might eventually lead to serious 
injury. Members of the workforce are likely to be sensitive to the type and frequency of 
accidents that go under-reported and, as such, their sense of workplace safety conditions might 
be a better indicator of safety risk than the routine accident reports (Thompson et al., 1998). 
However, this approach is complicated by questions about who is in the best position to provide 
the ratings. Some studies use supervisory or managerial attitudes towards employees’ safety 
behavior (Simard & Marchand, 1994; 1995; 1997), others use employees’ ratings of their own 
attitudes and those of their managers and supervisors. (Andriessen, 1978; Thompson et al., 
1998). However, the judgments are likely to be influenced by attribution bias (i.e., attribute poor 
performance to other people rather than one’s self). Employees may have little direct evidence of 
management attitudes to safety; rather, they may infer managerial attitudes on the basis of their 
experiences of supervision. Similarly, management who are removed from operations may have 
little direct experience of employee opinions (Clarke, 1999). In most of the studies published in 
the literature, no explanation is given for the choice of respondent used. It seems that 
methodological convenience, as much as theoretical reasoning, is driving the decision. 
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Climate is linked to safety outcomes through behavior-outcome expectancies. These 
expectancies guide behavior through learning. Evidence has shown that safety behaviors are 
positively related to company safety records, and reduced accident and injury rates. Cooper and 
Phillips (2004) established an empirical link between a limited set of safety climate perceptions 
and actual safety behavior. They also demonstrated that changes in climate perceptions do not 
necessarily reflect changes in levels of behavioral safety performance. Equally, changes in safety 
behavior are not necessarily reflected in safety climate perceptions. Such results remind us that it 
is reductions in the frequency of unsafe behaviors and their antecedents (i.e., unsafe conditions 
or situations) that reduce the opportunity for accidents to occur, not perceptions about how safety 
is operationalized. The findings strongly suggests that industry should focus its primary safety 
improvement effort on changing unsafe situations and conditions, as well as people’s safety 
behavior at all organizational levels, rather than concentrating on improving people’s attitudes, 
beliefs, and perceptions about safety. The authors argue for the use of a variety of safety 
performance outcome variables, rather than relying primarily on self-report instruments. 
More recently, a number of meta-analytic studies have been conducted in order to 
evaluate the relationship between safety climate as a holistic construct and accident rates. Clarke 
(2006) used a meta-analysis to examine the validity of the relationship between safety climate 
and safety performance and occupational accidents and injuries (r=0.2). The study found support 
for the link between organizational safety climate and employee safety participation; however, 
the links to accident involvement were found to be weak. Not surprisingly, the relationship 
between safety climate and accident involvement was moderated by the study design, such that 
only prospective design, (i.e., studies in which accidents were measured following the 
measurement of safety climate) demonstrated validity generalization. Those studies that were 
retrospective (i.e., studies where the measurement of accidents or injuries is taken before the 
measurement of safety climate) did not show such a link. This finding holds with the principle 
that climate predicts accidents and not the other way around. 
Similarly, Nahrgang, Morgeson, and Hofmann (2007) conducted a meta-analysis that 
examined the relationship between safety performance and its antecedents—including safety 
climate—in order to establish which factors are more influential in establishing strong safety 
performance (accident and injury rates, and positive safety behavior). Results indicate safety-
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related antecedents (such as risks and hazards, safety prevention, and safety involvement) and 
general antecedents (leadership and commitment) have moderate to strong relationships with 
safety climate. Leadership and safety climate both demonstrate moderately negative relationships 
to accidents and injuries, and moderately positive relationships with positive safety behavior. 
However, risks and hazards is the only safety-related antecedent, which correlates with accidents 
and injuries. Leadership also demonstrates moderate relationships with the two safety outcomes 
of accidents and injuries and positive safety behavior. Overall, safety climate negatively 
correlates with accidents and injuries. 
The studies suggest that the behaviors that underlie safety culture are even more critical 
as indicators of an organization’s safety performance than other, more traditional, measures such 
as accident or incident rates. Herein lies the greatest strength of the concept. Safety climate 
introduces the notion that the likelihood of accidents occurring can be predicted on the basis of 
certain organizational factors. These organizational factors can be used as leading indicators to 
identify, in advance, the strengths and weaknesses within an organization that influence the 
likelihood of accidents occurring. Once weaknesses are identified, remedial actions can be taken 
(Flin et al., 2000). 
To summarize, as would be hoped, there would appear to be a link between safety 
climate and mishaps. However, the relationship is not as strong as may be expected, part of 
which can be attributed to the difficulties in obtaining accurate and truthful mishap data. In the 
next section, the safety climate research that has been carried out in aviation will be delineated, 
with particular emphasis on the tools used by U.S. Naval aviation. 
E. SAFETY CLIMATE ASSESSMENT IN AVIATION 
Wiegmann and colleagues (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004) 
report that “few formally documented efforts have been made to assess safety culture within the 
aviation industry, with the notable exception of military aviation” (p. 117). This finding is 
surprising, given that the civilian aviation industry has led other high reliability in developing 
and utilizing a number of human-focused safety programs (e.g., crew resource management). 
However, the extent to which safety climate surveys are being used in commercial aviation is 
difficult to assess. It is recognized that there are undoubtedly many aviation consultancy 
companies carrying out safety climate assessments. However, because this information is not in 
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the public domain, this work cannot be reviewed. Below is a discussion of 10 studies carried out 
in commercial aviation that report a safety climate evaluation, and are available in the  
public domain. 
1. Commercial Pilots 
The Australian Transportation Safety Board (2004) and Evans, Glendon, and Creed 
(2007) both reported on a study examining the safety climate of Australian pilots. The 
questionnaire consisted of six safety factors (management commitment, training, equipment and 
maintenance, rules and procedures, communication, and schedules), each with five items. These 
factors were based upon previous safety climate research and input from aviation safety experts. 
Data from half of the sample were used in an exploratory factor analysis that resulted in a three 
factor model of: management commitment and communication, safety training and equipment, 
and maintenance. A confirmatory factor analysis on the remaining half of the sample showed the 
three factor model to be an adequate fit to the data. Finally, the responses from different types of 
pilots (regular public transport, charter, or aerial work such as emergency medical services or 
agriculture) were compared on each of the four identified safety climate factors. No significant 
differences between the groups were found. The Australian Transportation Safety Board (2004) 
concluded that this was due to a single professional safety climate for pilots as a group, 
regardless of the organization for whom they worked. 
Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann (2006) developed a questionnaire designed to 
assess safety culture within the context of airline flight operations. The survey consisted of 84 
items, grouped into five themes (organizational commitment, management involvement, 
employee empowerment, reward systems, and reporting systems). The survey was designed by 
examining the content of safety climate questionnaires that have been used in other HROs. A 
total of 503 responses were received from a single company. After discarding 29 items and using 
a confirmatory factor analysis technique, the analysis eventually resulted in structure of four 
broad factors (organizational commitment, operations personnel, informal safety system, and 
formal safety system), with three subfactors in each. The authors attribute the difficulty in 
establishing a stable factor structure with the analysis to issues in item writing (e.g., ambiguity, 
items that did not relate well to the target population). Another issue not mentioned in the paper 
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is the relatively low ratio of items to responses. No analysis of the revised questionnaire  
was reported. 
2. Cabin Staff 
Kao, Stewart, and Lee (2009) developed a 23-item questionnaire to assess the safety 
climate attitudes of Taiwanese cabin crews. The questionnaire was designed to assess the 
following safety climate themes: management commitment towards safety, cabin work 
environment, rule compliance, crewmember involvement and participation, accident 
investigation, and injury incidence. The items were based upon previous safety climate research. 
A total of 331 responses were obtained from cabin crews from four major Taiwanese airlines. 
Using a structural equation modeling approach, the researchers found an acceptable level of fit 
with the proposed factors. High management commitment to safety was significantly related to 
high crewmember participation in safety, and that safe cabin work environment was significantly 
related to crewmember’s individual behavior. However, the findings did not reveal a direct 
relationship between management commitment and injury incidence. 
3. Ground Handlers 
Diaz and Cabrera (1997) developed a 40-item safety climate questionnaire for aviation 
ground handlers, based upon the work of Zohar (1980). Following a PCA on the data collected 
from 166 ground handling personnel at a Spanish airport, six factors were identified: company 
policy towards safety, emphasis on productivity versus safety, group attitudes to safety, specific 
strategies of prevention, safety level perceived in the airport, and safety level perceived on the 
job. It was found that the questionnaire was able to discriminate between organizations with 
different levels of safety. 
Ek and Akselsson (2007) evaluated the safety culture in the ramp division of a ground 
handling company. A 109-item questionnaire was developed that addressed nine aspects of 
safety climate: working situation, communication, learning, reporting, justness, flexibility, 
attitudes towards safety, safety-related behaviors, and risk perception. Data were collected from 
50 men employed by a single ground handling company. Acceptable levels of internal 
consistency were found for each factor. They concluded that the safety climate was good, but 
poorer than desired by managers. 
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4. Aviation Maintainers 
As part of a larger research project, McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, and Cromie (2000) 
designed and utilized a safety climate questionnaire to survey aviation maintainers. The 
questionnaire was adapted from the one developed by Diaz and Cabrera (1997; described above). 
A 36-item questionnaire was designed based upon a factor analysis of 69 items (this analysis was 
not reported). A total of 622 responses were obtained from aviation maintainers from four 
companies. Significant differences in climate were found between different occupational groups. 
McDonald et al. (2000) reported that the data provided evidence of a strong professional 
subculture, which spanned all of the four companies that participated in the study. Further, this 
subculture is relatively independent of the organization. It was postulated that the subculture is 
likely to mediate between the organization’s safety management system and safety outcome. 
5. Air Traffic Controllers 
 Gordon, Kirwan, Mearns, Kennedy and Jensen (2007) describe a pilot study of a climate 
survey designed for use by European air traffic controllers (ATC). The questionnaire consisted of 
59 items of 13 elements designed around three themes (priority of safety, involvement of safety, 
and learning from safety). The items were selected based upon a literature review, 50 interviews 
with ATC personnel, and input from subject matter experts on the final items to be included. The 
questionnaire was piloted with 119 responses obtained. Following an exploratory factor analysis, 
an 8-factor questionnaire resulted (see Table 1 for a description of the factors). Gordon et al. 
(2007) acknowledge that the sample was small, and they state that a larger validation study will 
be carried out. 
6. Combined Commercial Aviation 
Patankar (2003) evaluated the safety climate of a stratified sample of 399 personnel 
(flight operations, maintenance, and other personnel) from a single aviation company using a 
common safety climate questionnaire. The questionnaire was based upon the cockpit 
management attitude questionnaire, (CMAQ; Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990), the 
maintenance resource management/technical operations questionnaire (MRM/TOQ; Taylor, 
2000), and the CSAS (discussed in detail below). After a factor analysis (no details of this were 
reported), eight factors emerged: pride in company, professionalism, safety opinions, supervisor 
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trust and safety, effects of my stress, need to speak up, safety compliance, and hazard 
communication. Significant differences were found between flight operations, maintenance, and 
“other” personnel with regard to the factors of pride in company, safety opinions, and supervisor 
trust. Patankar (2003) concluded that, overall, the respondents were proud to work for the 
company, trusted management, and believed that safety is a result of collective efforts. It also 
was commented on that both flight and maintenance personnel had a high sense of personal 
responsibility for flight safety. 
In a later study, the data collected by Patankar (2003; called company A) was compared 
to 237 responses collected at another company (called company B; Kelly & Patankar, 2004). It 
was found that, overall, there was a more positive safety climate at company A than company B. 
However, this finding was partially attributed to company A having older and more experienced 
pilots and mechanics than company B. 
Block, Sabin, and Patanakar (2007) reanalyzed the responses obtained from the 281 pilots 
from the Patanakar (2003) sample. The purpose was to examine whether the data supported what 
Block et al. (2007) described as the purpose-alignment-control (PAC) model. A pair of experts 
recoded the Patankar (2003) survey items in accordance with the PAC model. The proposed 
factors were tested using a structural equation modeling methodology. The main drivers of safety 
outcomes were organizational affiliation (similar to pride in company from Patankar, 2003) and 
proactive management (partially derived from safety opinion factor from Patankar, 2003). 
Organizational affiliation was directly influenced by communication, and proactive management 
was influenced by training effectiveness and relational supervision. 
Gill and Shergill (2004) conducted a safety climate review across the New Zealand 
commercial aviation industry. The safety climate questionnaire they developed included 
questions designed to address two themes: organizations’ approach to safety management  
(26 items) and “safety management systems, and safety culture in organizations” (26 items). A 
factor analysis of 464 responses was run independently on each theme. The “safety management 
systems” theme was found to consist of four factors: positive safety practices; safety education; 
implementation of safety policies and procedures; and individual’s safety responsibilities. The 
“safety culture in organizations” theme was also found to consist of four subfactors: 
organizational dynamics and positive safety practices; regulator’s role; luck and safety; and 
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safety management, training, and decision making. The main findings from the study were that 
pilots believed luck and safety to be the most important factor in aviation safety, and employers 
were not perceived to be placing much importance on safety management systems and  
safety culture. 
As can be seen from the review of the safety climate literature described earlier, a 
summarization of the research carried out in commercial aviation indicates that the themes are 
not dissimilar from those identified in nonaviation HRO safety climate research. The commercial 
aviation studies reviewed generally describe the development of “new” research questionnaires 
that, in most cases, have only been used once with a maximum of a few hundred respondents, 
and represent a one-time safety climate assessment. Furthermore, no attempts were made to 
examine the discriminate validity of the measures by correlating the survey data with other safety 
performance measures (e.g., accident rate). In contrast, U.S Naval aviation has been collecting 
data on safety climate continuously since 2000. The tools used to assess safety climate in Naval 
aviation will be discussed in the next section. 
F. SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT IN NAVAL AVIATION 
The U.S. Navy utilizes two different tools to assess safety climate in aviation. The CSAS 
is used to obtain feedback from aviators, and the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey 
(MCAS) to obtain information from aviation maintainers. It should also be mentioned that, 
although not discussed in detail here, the Navy also conducts safety climate workshops with 
aviation squadrons. The facilitators (specially trained senior naval aviators) conduct 
observations, interviews, and focus groups with squadron personnel. The purpose is to identify 
potential hazards that may interfere with mission accomplishment (see O’Connor & O’Dea, 
2007, for more details). However, this program is run independently of the safety climate survey. 
The safety culture questionnaires were developed by researchers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Desai, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2006). Both 
questionnaires are completed online, and responses are obtained for each item on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In 2004, Vice Admiral Zortman declared 
the MCAS and CSAS mandatory for all squadrons to complete semiannually and within 30 days 
following a change of command (Zortman, 2004). The results of a squadron’s survey are only 
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available to the Commanding Officer (CO). However, aggregated data is made available to all 
COs for comparison of their squadron’s performance with their peers. 
The theoretical background underpinning the questionnaires is based upon the work 
carried out by Roberts et al. on HROs (Desai et al., 2006). Libuser (1994) developed a theoretical 
Model of Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) that identified five major areas relevant 
to organizations in managing risk and developing a climate to reduce accidents. The five MOSE 
areas are: 
 Process Auditing – a system of ongoing checks to monitor hazardous conditions 
(e.g., “My command conducts adequate reviews and updates of safety standards 
and operating procedures.”). 
 Reward System – expected social compensation or disciplinary action to reinforce 
or correct behavior (e.g., “Command leadership encourages reporting safety 
discrepancies without the fear of negative repercussions.”). 
 Quality Assurance – policies and procedures that promote high quality 
performance (e.g., “Quality standards in my command are clearly stated in formal 
publications and procedural guides.”). 
 Risk Management – how the organization perceives risk and takes corrective 
action (e.g., “My command takes the time to identify and assess risks associated 
with its flight operations.”). 
 Command and Control – policies, procedures, and communication processes used 
to mitigate risk (e.g., “Crew rest standards are enforced in my command.”). 
On the basis of observations and interviews with maintainers, the MCAS has an additional 
sixth MOSE called “communication/functional relationships.” This theme is concerned with 
having an environment in which information is freely exchanged, quality assurance is seen as a 
positive influence, and maintenance workers are shielded from external pressures to complete a 
task (Harris, 2000). A description of the research that has been carried out using the MCAS data 
will be described first, followed by studies that have utilized the CSAS. 
1. Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) 
A considerable amount of work examining the psychometric properties of the MCAS was 
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carried out by Naval Postgraduate School Masters’ students in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Given the similarities between the MCAS and CSAS, and the lack of published research on the 
CSAS (see below for a discussion), these theses will be briefly described. 
The MCAS was developed by Baker (1998) directly from the CSAS. He carried out 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on 268 responses from the maintenance personnel of three 
reserve Naval squadrons. He found that 25 out of the 67 items loaded on a single principle 
component. However, as all of the six MOSEs were represented in this principle component, he 
concluded that there is no evidence against the theoretical underpinning of the questionnaire. As 
a result of the analysis, Baker (1998) proposed a revision of the questionnaire consisting of  
35 items. 
The next study, carried out by Oneto (1999), was a PCA of 439 responses collected from 
maintainers at eight reserve squadrons. Oneto used the revised survey recommended by Baker 
(1998). Again, Oneto (1999) found a single principle component that explained a third of the 
variance. As this principle component consisted of items from all of the MOSEs, he also 
concluded that the theoretical model was sound. 
Goodrum (1999) assessed the 1,000 responses from a Naval Air Reserve Fleet Logistics 
Support Wing. Again, following PCA, the first principle component explained a third of the 
variance, with the six items that loaded the highest on this component from four of the  
six MOSEs. 
Harris (2000) examined the responses of 977 maintainers at a Marine Air Wing. Similar 
to the earlier studies, Harris reported a single principle component that explained a third of the 
variance, with almost all of the items from the questionnaire loading on this principle 
component. Harris then used the six MOSE components to interpret the data, and found 
statistically significant differences between squadrons. However, he did not find a statistically 
significant relationship between safety climate and aircraft-maintenance-related incidents. 
Stanley (2000), using the same dataset as Harris (2000), examined the relationship between 
demographics and MCAS. He found that demographics had little utility in predicting the scores 
of a given unit. 
Hernandez (2001) examined 2,180 maintainer responses from 30 Naval aviation units 
using the online and paper and pencil versions of the test. Similar to Harris (2000), she did not 
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find that demographic data correlated with the MCAS response. The results of a PCA of the data 
resulted in a single dominant principle component that explained approximately a third of the 
variance. Furthermore, almost all of the questionnaire items loaded on this principle component. 
Hernandez (2001) did not find a significant relationship between MCAS score and aircraft-
maintenance-related incident rate, or a significant difference in responses based upon the method 
of completing the questionnaire. 
Most recently, Brittingham (2006) examined the MCAS responses from 126,058 
maintainers collected between 2000 and 2005. After completing a PCA, she found that, prior to 
rotation, one principle component accounted for approximately 50% of the variance. She states 
that after varimax rotation, a second principle component emerged. The first principle 
component consisted of items concerned with overall command attention to safety, and the 
second related to workload and the availability of appropriate resources. However, Brittingham 
(2006) interprets these findings very differently from the MCAS studies described earlier. As the 
six MOSE components were not identified as an individual factors part of the PCA process, 
Brittingham (2006) states that “the MCAS was found to be an inadequate tool with questionable 
validity for gauging maintenance safety climate” (p. 31). 
It could be argued that both the interpretation of Brittingham (2006) and that of the 
earlier studies are flawed, due to the lack of a clear understanding of the methodology that was 
employed to identify the principle components. PCA is the method to use when the researcher is 
attempting to reduce a large number of variables to a smaller number of components (Stevens, 
1996). PCA analyzes variance with the goal of extracting the maximum variance from a data set 
with a few orthogonal (i.e., uncorrelated) components (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Since 
principle component scores are always uncorrelated by construction, unrotated PCA never 
accounts for correlations between the presumed factors underlying the observations. Furthermore 
principle components (or their coefficients) are never chosen with reference to a body of theory; 
they always arise automatically from the maximization of variance explained. 
Another related issue, which may have accounted for the large proportion of items 
loading on a single principle component, is the large proportion of respondents responding 
positively to the items. To illustrate, Goodrum (1999) reported that all questions were answered 
positively, with a mean range of between 3.17 and 4.37 (on a 5-point scale). Hernandez (2001) 
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reported a mean range between 3.18 and 4.15 for the items. Therefore, it would appear that there 
is limited variability in the responses to the items. This creates problems when carrying out a 
PCA because if all of the items have a similar lack of variability, then the PCA will tend to 
identify one principle component with a large number of items. 
The other problem with items with low variability is that they are not useful from a 
discriminatory perspective. For example, Brittingham (2006) reported that for item 7 “our 
command climate promotes safe maintenance,” 89% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, 
and only 6% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Therefore, this item is not useful in distinguishing 
between high- and low-performing groups because the majority of participants are in agreement. 
A more discriminatory item reported in the Brittingham (2006) study was item 27 “day/night 
checks have equal workloads and staffing is sufficient on each shift.” Although it could be 
argued that this item is asking two separate questions at the same time, at least there is some 
variance in response, with 58% agreeing or strongly agreeing and 34% disagreeing or strongly 
disagreeing. Therefore, item 27 may be useful in discriminating between different groups. The 
danger of retaining a large number of nondiscriminating items when exploring differences 
between different groups of respondents is that the discriminating items can become “washed 
out” when they are averaged with nondiscriminating items. Therefore, the use of PCA with a 
large number of low variance items may account for finding a single factor on which the 
majority of MCAS items load. 
2. The Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) 
Compared to the MCAS, there has been much less research published examining the 
CSAS. An unpublished manuscript of an exploratory factor analysis of 1,254 surveys resulted in 
a 34-item, 3-factor model (Sengupta, 2000). The 3-factor model was also found to be an 
acceptable fit to the data when a confirmatory factor analysis was carried out. No attempt was 
made to name the factors, nor was there any discussion of the results in the manuscript. In a 
second study, Adamshick (2007) analyzed the data of every Navy and Marine Corps  
Strike-Fighter aviator that completed the CSAS from 2001 until 2005 (2,943 responses). He 
carried out PCA independently for the items that make up each of the five theoretical factors of 
the CSAS. For all of the factors, except for quality assurance and reward systems (for Naval 
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aviators only), it was found that a two or more factors solution resulted in a better fit to the 
theoretically-derived factors than a single factor model. 
Given the failure of both of these studies to establish a factor structure that is consistent 
with the MOSE, the construct validity of the questionnaire arguably is in doubt. Further, the 
original work to establish the factor structure was carried out a decade ago. The safety climate of 
Naval aviation has not remained stagnant during this period. A number of safety programs have 
matured and become more widely utilized (e.g., crew resource management, operational risk 
management, human factors councils/boards; see O’Connor & O’Dea, 2007 for more details). 
Therefore, there is a need to reexamine the factor structure and assess the construct validity of 
the CSAS. 
In fact, although the CSAS was used unaltered from 2000 until 2009, the content of the 
questionnaire had changed recently. The MOSE framework model was abandoned in favor of a 
framework that is loosely based upon the organizational influence and supervisor levels of the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). A 
total of 31 items from the original CSAS were retained, and an additional 16 items were 
included. The rationale behind the changing of the theoretical background to the questionnaire, 
the reasoning behind discarding items, and how the new items were selected is unknown to these 
authors. Nevertheless, this revision to the CSAS does not negate the research being carried out to 
link the nine years of CSAS data with mishaps. Rather, this research effort will either confirm 
the changes that were made to the CSAS, or offer guidance as to how the questionnaire can be 
further improved. 
Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli (2003) compared the responses of health care 
respondents with those from Naval aviation. Aviators responded to CSAS and hospital workers 
to the Patient Safety Cultures in Healthcare Organizations (PSYCHO) survey. Both of these 
instruments have partially overlapping items, with 23 items from the PSYCHO adopted directly 
from the CSAS. The survey included employees from 15 hospitals and Naval aviators from 226 
squadrons. For each question a “problematic response” was defined that suggested a lack of or 
antithesis to safety climate (Gaba et al., 2003). Overall, the problematic response rate for hospital 
workers was up to 12 times greater than that among aviators on certain items. These findings 
were true both for the aggregate of all health care respondents and, even more strikingly, for 
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respondents from particularly hazardous health care arenas (e.g., emergency rooms and critical 
care) the number of problematic responses were 16 times greater than among aviators. 
However, the study did reveal a few similarities between hospital personnel and Naval 
aviators regarding specific safety climate features covered by the matched questions. In both 
sectors, respondents were highly uniform in their belief that their institution is committed to and 
has a good reputation for safety. They both expressed concern about the level of resources 
provided for them to accomplish their jobs, although health care workers were even more 
concerned than aviators about the effect on safety of a loss of experienced personnel. 
Nonetheless, for most questions across all aspects of safety climate, there were low rates of 
problematic response among Naval aviators (generally under 10%), but a much higher rate 
among health care workers, by a factor of three or more. Thus, the overall pattern of results 
suggests that the military safety climate is quite high compared to other HROs. 
Desai et al. (2006) measured the relationship between recent accidents and perceptions of 
safety climate, as measured by the CSAS, on a large, cross-sectional sample of respondents in 
several Naval aviation squadrons. The notion was to understand potential cognitive and 
behavioral changes following accidents. They hypothesized that safety climate would improve 
after an accident occurred because actual changes in safety climate occurred, or cognitive bias 
(fundamental attribution error) occurs in which people are more likely to blame situational 
factors rather than people. 
The study used the 6,361 responses from 147 Naval squadrons taking the online CSAS 
between July 2000 and December 2001. Aviation mishap information was collected from the 
U.S. Naval Safety Centre (the number of mishaps used was not reported). These accidents are 
measured by their intensity and are divided into Class A, Class B, and Class C mishaps. At the 
time of the research, the definition of a Class A mishap was damage of $1 million or more, or an 
injury or occupational illness resulting in a fatality or permanent total disability. Class B mishaps 
involve a total mishap cost of $200,000 or more, but less than $1 million, or an injury or 
occupational illness that results in permanent partial disability or for which three or more persons 
are hospitalized. Class C mishaps are accidents in which the total cost of reportable material 
property damage is $10,000 or more, but less than $200,000, a nonfatal injury that causes any 
loss of time from work beyond the day or shift on which it occurred, or a nonfatal illness or 
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disease that causes loss of time from work because of disability (Chief of Naval  
Operations, 2001). 
The dependent variable was a safety climate perception construct developed by 
aggregating each individual’s responses to the CSAS. Six independent variables were 
constructed to measure accidents prior to survey administration. These mishap variables were 
recorded at the squadron group level of analysis. All individuals within the squadron received the 
squadron value for these mishap variables for the present analysis. 
Desai et al. (2006) regressed the safety climate construct on several indicator variables 
tracking the occurrence of accidents, grouped by their severity, in periods roughly one year prior 
to survey measurement and two years prior to survey measurement. Analysis indicated positive 
associations between minor or intermediately severe accidents and future safety climate scores, 
although no effect was found for major accidents. These findings suggest a generally positive 
association between minor or intermediately severe accidents and perceived safety climate. This 
study suffers in that only limited information was obtained on the mishaps. Also, although the 
number of mishaps that occurred during the period of study were not reported, the number was 
likely to be fairly low. Finally, the rationale that the safety climate will improve after a mishap 
may be flawed. If the squadron personnel believe that the causes of the mishap have not been 
addressed, it may be that the safety climate may go down, rather than improve, as suggested by 
Desai et al. 
One unpublished study investigated whether the responses to the CSAS can predict 
aviation mishap rate. After some earlier encouraging analysis in support of the predictive validity 
of the CSAS, Schimpf and Figlock (2006) took the average (it is assumed that average refers to 
mean, although this is not stated) of the nine items from the risk assessment MOSE (the rationale 
for the focus on this particular MOSE was not provided), as well as the overall average of the  
61-item CSAS for each respondent from August 2000 until October 2004. They divided the 
squadrons into quartiles based upon the average scores. They then counted the number of 
squadrons that had experienced a Class A mishap within 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months 
after taking the survey within each quartile (no explanation was provided for how squadrons that 
had completed the questionnaire on multiple occasions within this time period, or squadrons that 
had multiple Class A mishaps, were handled). The data from this analysis are summarized in 
Figures 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1.   Class A mishaps within 12, 18, and 24 months after completing the CSAS (Quartiles by 
overall CSAS average; from Schimpf & Figlock, 2006). 
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Figure 2.   Class A mishaps within 12, 18, and 24 months after completing the CSAS (Quartiles by 
risk management average; from Schimpf & Figlock, 2006). 
These findings are encouraging for the predictive validity of the questionnaire. However, 
collapsing the questionnaire data to the extent that was done in this study is a coarse method to 
examine whether the CSAS is a useful predictor of mishap probability. Reducing a sample size 
of some 3,355,000 questionnaire responses (i.e., approximately 55,000 responses to 61 items) to 
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four data points (i.e., quartiles) would seem to be a very wasteful use of data, and will result in a 
very large restriction in variability. Moreover, if items for which there is little variability are 
included to calculate the mean, as discussed above with reference to the MCAS, those items for 
which there are variance may be washed out. It would also have been of interest to have seen the 
mean and standard deviation of the quartile scores (these were not reported). The final concern is 
that the rationale for choosing the risk management scale is not provided. It would have been 
interesting to know what would have been produced using the same methods, but with the other 
scales. Schimpf and Figlock (2006) also concluded that MCAS item 34 (I am provided adequate 
resources, time, personnel to accomplish my job.) was also a good indicator of Class A mishap 
risk, using the same method as described above (again, the reason for focusing specifically upon 
only this item is not delineated). 
In addition to the PCA described above, Adamshick (2007) also used the CSAS and 
MCAS to assess the relationship between leadership interventions and a respondent’s safety 
climate assessment. Most pertinent for this review were results regarding CSAS item 42 (my 
command provides a positive command climate that promotes safe flight operations) and MCAS 
item 7 (our command climate promotes safe maintenance). For CSAS item 42, the following 
rank/demographic differences emerged among Navy and Marine respondents: senior officers 
reported significantly higher scores than junior officers; among pilots, those with more than 
2,000 flight hours reported significantly higher scores than those with fewer hours, especially 
those who had between 500 and 1,000 flight hours. In addition, Navy department heads reported 
significantly higher scores than nondepartment heads and, among Marines, differences emerged 
between reservists in the following order: driller reserves had higher scores than active reserves, 
who, in turn, reported higher scores than regular status respondents. 
For MCAS item 7, rank differences occurred among Naval respondents, in which officers 
tended to report higher scores than enlisted; among enlisted, the higher the rank, the higher the 
score. Work frame differences also emerged, in which respondents in maintenance control had 
the highest scores, whereas avionics reported significantly lower scores than most other work 
frames. As would be expected, night shift respondents reported lower scores than day  
shift respondents. 
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Adamshick (2007) suggests a variety of reasons for these demographic differences. For 
example, rank differences may be due to senior officers’ bias in rating programs for which they 
are responsible. Junior enlisted may be more frustrated than senior enlisted due to increased 
responsibility, yet not commensurate rank increase. Regarding the response difference by 
number of total flight hours, it may be that those pilots with 500-1,000 hours are no longer 
novice pilots that find flying challenging and, at the same time, have started to have some 
authority. Adamshick also points out that greater flight hours are positively correlated with rank 
and authority. 
Adamshick’s (2007) results also indicate that perceived leadership factors positively 
associated with safety climate differ between officers and enlisted. For officers, four  
factors emerged:  
1. use Human Factors Boards (a regular proactive, informal review of all officer and 
enlisted aircrew; see O’Connor & O’Dea, 2007 for more details);  
2. leadership that encourages and enables individuals to report unsafe behaviors;  
3. leadership that successfully communicates safety goals to personnel; and  
4. leadership that reacts to unexpected changes. 
For enlisted respondents, three leadership factors were positively associated with  
safety climate:  
1. leadership adequately reviews and updates safety procedures; 
2. leadership does not tolerate unprofessional behavior; and  
3. leadership uses comprehensive and effective safety education and training 
programs. 
Thus, in comparison to the Schimp and Figlock (2006) report, Adamshick’s results suggest that a 
finer-grained analysis of the CSAS and MCSAS is merited. 
G. CONCLUSION 
It is argued that safety culture surveys can retrieve information that is not accessible 
through other more traditional methods of analysis, such as audits and risk assessments. Bailey 
and Petersen (1989) concluded that the effectiveness of safety programs cannot be measured by 
the more traditional procedural-engineering criteria popularly thought to be factors in successful 
programs. They argue that a better measure of safety program effectiveness is the response from 
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the entire organization to questions about the quality of the management systems that have an 
effect on human behavior relating to safety. They further concluded that perceptions surveys can 
effectively identify the strengths and weaknesses of a safety system’s elements. However, for a 
safety climate survey to be useful, it must have construct and discriminate validity. 
It is suggested that a comprehensive assessment of the validity of the CSAS is long 
overdue. The construct validity of the questionnaire has never been established, and there is only 
weak evidence supporting the discriminate validity of the tool. There is no specific proof that the 
CSAS is not identifying “at risk” squadrons. However, there is also no strong evidence that it is 
supplying helpful information to leadership. In the absence of a valid tool, time and money is 
being wasted administrating the survey. However, most importantly, the opportunity of 
preventing mishaps by providing useful feedback to leadership is being missed. 
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